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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LOUIS ORTIZ,
Plaintifi7Appellant
COURT OF APPEALS
vs.
Case No. 950391-CA

GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS,
Defendants/Appellees

Priority No. 15

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF
FACTS AND ARGUMENT REGARDING THE JURY'S FINDING
OF "NO NEGLIGENCE" ON THE PART OF GENEVA ROCK
PRODUCTS
POINT I — DEFENDANT, IN HIS STATEMENT OF THE CASE,
MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ON SEVERAL KEY
ISSUES
Defendant states, "The plaintiff knew that he was standing in an area where the
concrete chute would hit him if the mechanics were able to get the chute working." (Brief
of Appellee at 2, fl5). In fact, this is precisely the opposite of what plaintiff testified:
Q. [By defendant's counsel] Was there any doubt in your mind that
you were standing in an area where you could be hit by the chute if it
swung?
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A. [Ortiz] It didn't even enter into my mind; I am sorry.
(R. at 570).
Defendant's brief then goes on to state that "plaintiff agreed that he did not need
to be in the area where he was standing..." (Brief of Appellee at 2,1(8), and that no one,
not even plaintiffs supervisor Cisneros, told him to stand in that area or felt he "needed"
to stand there (Brief of Appellee at 2,ffif9, 10). Defendant omits the fact that plaintiff
testified he "always" stood in the work area (R. at 575), and that Cisneros knew where
Ortiz was standing and believed this to be an appropriate place for Ortiz to stand and wait
(R. at 385, 398).
Further, as to the testimony of Stephen Barnes, the mechanic involved in the
incident, defendant states that when Barnes "arrived at the scene and began working on
the truck, the plaintiff was not present in the area, nor was any other member of the
concrete finishing crew," (Brief of Appellee at 3, ^f 12), and that when Barnes arrived at
the scene, "he noticed that there were no workers anywhere near the area where the
concrete truck was situated." (Brief of Appellee at 7)
In fact, Barnes contradicted himself on this issue, testifying both that he noticed
there were no workers in the area, and that he didn't notice whether or not there was
anyone in the area:
Q. (examination by defendant) When you got to the truck to work
on it, was there a crew, any finishing crew in the area?
A. (Barnes) I didn't see any. [R at 646]
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Q. Did you wonder where the crew was when you first pulled up?
A. Yeah. When I first got there, I didn't see anybody around and I
asked Paul where the finishers were and he said they were down the street.
[R. at 649]
• •••

Q. (examination by plaintiff) And when you first arrived, there was
nobody in this area?
A. (Barnes) I never noticed whether there was anyone there or not.
[R. at 657]
Obviously, it mischaracterized the trial testimony to imply that this witness made
a conscious effort to check the area to see if anyone was present in the area of the truck
and chute, when the witness himself is unclear about what he did or did not see or do
when he arrived on the scene. Furthermore, both Cisneros and Ortiz testified that
Ortiz was in the area when Barnes arrived, because Ortiz had accompanied the truck
when the driver moved it to show Cisneros where the next pour area would be (R. at
384, 535).
Finally, defendant states that, after the chute froze up, the driver moved the truck
to "a different area" to effect repairs on site (Brief of Appellee at 6). Presumably, this is
an attempt to suggest that the driver had made a conscientious decision to move the truck
so that the repair work would not endanger the finishing crew. However, there was no
testimony presented that this was the case. Rather, the testimony of both Ortiz and
Cisneros was that the driver, accompanied by Ortiz, simply moved the truck to "the next
pour area," (R. at 384, 535), the very work area where the finishing crew would go once
they had completed their work in the area that had already been poured. It is absurd to
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suggest that the driver did not know Ortiz was there or that he did not expect the crew to
arrive in the new work area.
POINT II — ALL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND ARGUMENTS SET
FORTH BY THE DEFENDANT, BOTH AT TRIAL AND IN HIS BRIEF,
SPEAK TO THE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. AT NO
TIME DOES DEFENDANT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR
ARGUMENT WHATSOEVER OF "NO NEGLIGENCE" ON THE PART
OF THE DEFENDANT, GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS
Defendant, both at trial and in his brief, centered all his factual allegations,
testimony and argument around the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was also
negligent in his actions which resulted in the accident at issue. All testimony cited in by
defendant in his Statement of the Case and subsequent Argument [much of it disputed
above by plaintiff] attempts to argue that plaintiff knew or should have known that he
was standing in a dangerous area, and that, in so doing, he exhibited negligent,
unreasonable or inappropriate behavior. However, defendant presents no evidence
whatsoever to counter plaintiffs evidence that defendant was negligent.
In his opening remarks to the jury, defendant's counsel acknowledges that his
client was negligent, but that he intended to show to the jury that the plaintiff was also
negligent:
(Naegle to the jury) You will have to determine who is really
responsible. Whether Mr. Ortiz is at least equally responsible for his own
conduct. We will take half of the blame, but Mr. Ortiz must take the other
half... (emphasis added) [R. at 373]
Having set forth to the jury that his client was "half' responsible for the accident,
defendant's counsel then elicits testimony from plaintiff designed to show that plaintiff,
4

also, was negligent. At no time during the trial does defendant present even a scintilla of
evidence that defendant's actions which resulted in injury to the plaintiff were not in any
way negligent
Defendant did not call the driver of the truck to the testify, and the mechanic
involved in the accident testified both he should have broken down the chute before
attempting any repairs and that the driver of the truck was ultimately responsible for
actions of the cement chute (see statements and argument in Point I, above), assessments
that were shared by plaintiffs witnesses Cisneros and Padgen (see statements and
argument in Point III, below).
Consequently, in his brief, defendant is unable to cite to any statement on the
record that might suggest that defendant was not guilty of any negligence in the actions
resulting in this accident. Instead, defendant once again makes factual allegations, some
disputed by plaintiff, but all speaking solely to the issue of plaintiff s alleged comparative
negligence. Defendant's entire argument, is therefore, irrelevant, as the issue at bar does
not concern comparative negligence, but involves only the finding of "no negligence" on
the part of the defendant.
Clearly, because of the admission by defendant's counsel that his client was half
responsible for the accident, combined with the fact that defendant's counsel presented no
evidence exonerating completely his client's actions, it is impossible that the jury, upon
reviewing the evidence, could have come to a verdict of "no negligence" on the part of
Geneva Rock Products.
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POINT III — PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, BOTH AT TRIAL
AND IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF, THE "STANDARD OF CARE" FOR THE
ON-SITE REPAIR OF THE CEMENT CHUTE THROUGH THE
TESTIMONY OF GARY CISNEROS, GEORGE PADGEN, AND
STEPHEN BARNES.
Defendant contradicts himself in his argument regarding expert testimony
concerning the "standard of care" for the repair of the cement chute. Defendant first
contends that plaintiff knew he was in a "dangerous area," knew the chute was broken
and that the mechanic and driver were trying to repair it, had "some 20 years experience
in the concrete business" (R. at 569), and so on and so forth. (Brief of Appellee at 2) In
fact, defendant argues that plaintiffs experience in concrete work had resulted in such a
high level of knowledge regarding the standard of care for repairing cement truck chutes,
that plaintiff "negligently placed himself in a position of danger and that his injury was a
result of his own failure to act reasonably." (Brief of Appellee at 8)
Defendant then goes on to argue that neither the plaintiff Ortiz, his supervisor
Gary Cisneros, nor even plaintiffs expert George Padgen, "had any expertise regarding
the standard of care for repairing cement trucks, either on site or at the shop." (Brief of
Appellee at 3, ^fll)
Clearly, defendant has defeated himself with his own argument. Cisneros and
Padgen each had more than 20 years experience in the concrete business. (R. at 377,405)
Both were supervisors who possessed, by virtue of their experience [as acknowledged by
defendant], expertise in the standard of care required for the on-site repair of a cement
truck chute. Both testified that plaintiff was standing in a reasonable and appropriate
area when the incident occurred (R. at 385, 398, 412, 417). Both testified that the driver
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of the cement truck is responsible at all times for the location and action of the cement
chute, and that it is the driver's responsibility to keep the chute out of the worker's area
(R. at 399, 417), an expert opinion also expressed by defendant's own witness, Stephen
Barnes, the mechanic involved in the incident (R. at 656-657). Both testified that the
chute should have been "broken down" before any repair was attempted (R. at 389-90,
415, 417), again an expert opinion also expressed by defendant's own witness, the
mechanic involved in the incident (R. at 659). Even if defendant is reluctant to accept the
expertise of plaintiff s witnesses, which expertise was not challenged at any time during
the trial defendant must accept the expertise of his own witness, the mechanic Stephen
Barnes.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF
FACTS AND ARGUMENT REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE
In responding to plaintiffs Issue No. 2, defendant again brings up a series of
statements which do not speak to the issue of the admission of testimony regarding
injuries to the plaintiff which were not related to the accident. During the trial, defendant
cross-examined plaintiff regarding several accidents which resulted in injuries to
plaintiffs neck, shoulder, knee, etc. (R. at 578-586) None of these accidents caused or
were related in any way to the accident or the plaintiffs injuries which resulted from the
accident To briefly quote againfromBiswell
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The rule is well settled that when a defendant's negligence
aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one
to which the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the
injured person for the full amount of damages which ensue,
notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition.
Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80,88 (Utah App. 1987) [See Brief of Appellant at 18.]
Defendant, in his brief, dismisses this ruling without explanation, and instead cites
Turner v. General Adjusting Bureau, Inc. 832 P.2d 62, 69-70 (Utah App. 1992), applying
the "thin skull9' rule, as the determinative ruling on this issue. The two rulings appear,
then, to be contradictory, but the closer look shows they are not.
The Turner ruling states that plaintiff may not recover for any pre-existing
condition, and, indeed, plaintiff is not attempting to recover damages from defendant as
to any of the other injuries plaintiff may have suffered previously in his lifetime. The
trial court allowed testimony of previous injuries to plaintiff's neck, shoulder, et al.,
although plaintiff was not seeking recovery for any of those alleged injuries. Any
testimony presented by defendant regarding these alleged injuries was, therefore,
irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was working, was not under any medical care
or engaged in any physical therapy, and was not complaining of any injury to his back.
Hence, according to Turner, defendant, and the jury, was required to accept plaintiff
as they found him at the time of the accident — apparently healthy, active and
employed. According to the evidence, whatever damage may have been done to his back
from previous accidents was latent. The Biswell ruling states that if defendant's actions
aggravates or lights up a latent injury, then defendant is responsible for the full amount of
8

damages caused by the injury. Unless such evidence involved an active, debilitating
injury to plaintiffs back, any testimony presented by defendant regarding previous back
injuries can only be irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial.
Furthermore, evidence that plaintiff's knee might have eventually collapsed is also
irrelevant and prejudicial. Plaintiff's knee is not the injury being complained of, and,
according to the evidence presented at trial, at the time of the accident, any alleged injury
to plaintiffs knee was also latent and was not a factor in precipitating the accident.
Again, any testimony presented by defendant regarding this injury was, therefore,
irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial
CONCLUSION
The evidence is clear that the jury disregarded all evidence as well as the
admissions of defendant's own counsel in finding "no negligence" on the part of Geneva
Rock Products. The jury's verdict and the trial court's amended judgment should be set
aside. Alternatively, this Court should determine that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying plaintiffs Motion in Limine and should remand this case for a new trial with
instructions to bar all such evidence relating to alleged injuries which plaintiff might have
sustained in previous, unrelated accidents.
DATED this 15th day of January, 1997.
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/k\TTBILJA>jr
' Attorney for Plaintiff Louis Ortiz
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 15th day of January, 1997, I mailed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS to:

GEORGE T. NAEGLE, Esq. (5001)
GARY L. JOHNSON, Esq.
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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